Cuban Missile Crisis Essay
Examine the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ with particular reference to its origins and conclusions.
In my examination of the origins of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ I will primarily explain some history predating the 1959 Cuban Revolution but then investigate the rapid deterioration of the relations between the Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the United States of America before this 1962 confrontation. It was the ‘Cold War’ that acted as a catalyst within the origins of this crisis and introduced Soviet influence on the United States of American’s doorstep. The infamous failed ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion of Cuba by a force of mainly exiled Cubans funded and encouraged covertly by the US that developed the already established, ideological and military links between Cuba and the Soviet Union. I will examine both the origins and conclusions of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ within its ideological context and attempt to look at these events from the perspective of each ‘National Actor’ whilst trying to highlight some of their considerations, motivations, objectives and how different conclusions affected each country. I will also try to illustrate some limitations of the ‘Rational Actor Model[1]’ of analysis. The conclusions are many and varied but the most important for me is that even without nuclear parity the shared view was that ‘no other objective can be of greater importance than avoiding nuclear war[2]’ and that this, led finally, to a diplomatic solution. Khrushchev’s brinksmanship ultimately led to Cuba being safe from US invasion but, with no real strategic advantage for the Soviets, it was a factor in him loosing his job in 1965. Kennedy’s role in the crisis improved his own and America’s reputation on the world stage after the ‘Bay of Pigs’ fiasco but it left Castro in charge in Cuba without diminishing his export of revolutionary zeal, equipment and personnel. The Cuban Missile Crisis has also proved to be a long running ‘test case’ for historians and the study of Crisis Management and Crisis Prevention. These events also improved direct communications between the two ‘Cold War’ superpowers which made possible international agreements on test bans, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation and could be seen as a factor the later period of détente in the ‘Cold War’.
Some of the earliest origins of Cuba’s ‘October Crisis’ are rooted in their perception of the United States of America’s ‘imperial’ influence over them. Cuba was a Spanish colony until the end of the Spanish-American War in 1902 but this was no more that ’a change of masters’[3]for them and Castro ‘studied and admired the heroes of Cuba’s independence movement[4]’ like Jose Marti and hoped to have influence across South America like another of his heroes Simon Bolivar. In January 1959 Cuba’s Revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro, finally toppled the US backed military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista after over two years of guerrilla warfare. Upon taking power Castro initially tried to appease his US neighbours by issuing ‘a number of statements of moderate character’[5] whilst consolidating his position within Cuba. This posturing troubled close confidantes to the Cuban leader like Raul Castro and legendary Argentine Marxist ‘Che’ Guevara but they were later relieved when it became clear that he would ‘attack without delay the special link with the United States’ as to them it represented ‘a form of economic servitude.’[6]
The belief within successive American administrations in the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ that confirmed the role of the US in South America as defending it against imperial exploitation to ensure access to its resources and that if violated the US should ’go in and take over.[7]’ New American President John Fitzgerald Kennedy made the Cuban situation, part of his 1959 presidential campaign when he described Cuba as ‘the most glaring failure of American foreign policy.[8]’ Covert CIA plans to invade Cuba with a force of Cuban exiles was already planned before Kennedy took over and he immediately realised that it could cause problems with the USSR. Days after Kennedy accepted an invitation to meet again with Khrushchev the operation that became known as the ‘Bay Of Pigs’ had started in Cuba. Kennedy had not overcome his initial doubts about visible support from the US; he fatally altered the level of air support from the original plan which led to it being a total failure.
The Soviet Union had agreed in 1959 to send Cuba arms from Warsaw Pact countries but by November 1960 direct arms shipments were coming from the USSR. The fact that the Cuban Revolutionary Movement had keen Marxists at its centre and links with the Cuban Communist (PSP) was hidden at first but the Soviets knew this even if they had lingering doubts about Fidel Castro. When relations between the US and Cuba were deteriorating through the end of the Eisenhower administration the Soviets were quick to help out by taking the majority of the sugar exports that were cut by the US. Khrushchev was insecure about US military domination and was keen to develop Soviet influence in the world and would prove to be prepared to take risks to threaten US hegemony.
The key decision in the origins of this crisis was the clandestine deployment of nuclear warheads to Cuba whilst publicly stating that no ‘offensive’ weapons would be placed there. Castro’s initial doubts about links with the Socialist Bloc had evaporated and he was quoting saying ’Moscow is our brain and our great leader.’[9] Khrushchev had also received a disturbing KGB report from the US outlining that they knew the ‘Missile Gap’ was a fallacy and that it could be in the Americans interest to strike soon before any ‘real’ gap appears. This insecurity and a genuine wish to protect Castro’s revolution led to Khrushchev publicly supporting the Cubans and expressly promising to protect it from outside intervention. The ‘Bay Of Pigs’ invasion had worried Castro, hardened Cuban public against the United States of America, allowed Castro to publicly side with the Soviets and ultimately led to Khrushchev agreeing to supply nuclear material to the now overtly Socialist island of Cuba as a ‘deterrent’ against any future US aggression. This move by Khrushchev was risky and opportunistic as he said himself “this may end in a big war.[10]”
The world became aware of the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 22nd 1962 when American president John F Kennedy announced knowledge of a ‘soviet military build up’ including ‘offensive missile sites’ to provide a ‘nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.[11]’ Days earlier an America U2 surveillance plane pictured these missile sites being built and after a period of consultation the Americans wanted to show they were determined to get them removed and the ‘initial steps[12]’ would be a naval ‘quarantine[13]’ to ensure that no more ‘offensive’ military equipment could arrive on the island. This course of action was finally preferred to an air strike or full-scale invasion by Kennedy because of the threat of a nuclear exchange would be “one hell of a gamble.[14]” This option applied pressure but notably gave the Soviets a diplomatic route out of the conflict that after a number of extremely nervous days Khrushchev took. On October 28th the Soviets notified Washington without consulting Havana that in exchange for the removal of the missiles he would expect America to publicly commit to not invading Cuba. He had decided that ’a communist Cuba without missiles was better for Soviet interests than a U.S.-occupied Cuba.[15]’
One of the most important conclusions of this crisis is that both nuclear superpowers involved needed to protect their interests but ultimately tried to pursue a diplomatic solution to avoid the first nuclear exchange of the ‘Cold War.’ On the day of Kennedy’s October 22nd speech Khrushchev privately admitted “we were not going to unleash war, we just wanted to intimidate them and deter the Anti-Cuban forces[16]”. Even with Khrushchev’s brinksmanship Kennedy had the upper hand strategically. His fear was an air strike of all known missile sites may ‘risk that some remain undetected[17]’ that could then be fired in retaliation against America.
Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for a commitment by the Americans not to invade, to remove the blockade and the removal of US missiles in Turkey within six moths of the crisis. This was not known in the US until six years later and Khrushchev took sharp criticism from within the Presidium about this agreement not being made public. He was ousted a few years after the resolution of this crisis. Deeper analysis reflects that simply looking at the original decision from the ‘Rational Actor Model’ is to ignore the possibility that ’a number of different individuals’ quite distinct perceptions of separable problems snow balling into a single solution[18]’.
Fidel Castro was said to be initially livid about not being consulted about the decision to remove the missiles. Relations did improve later between Castro and Moscow, although, more radical elements within the Cuban government like ‘Che’ Guevara felt betrayed. In concluding the ‘deal’ the superpowers did not get an explicit agreement from Cuba to restrict their support of anti-imperialist movements around the world. In the next few years Cuba were involved in supporting revolutionaries in Andean Peru, Venezuela, Congo and numerous other places like Bolivia, where the incurable revolutionary ‘Che’ Guevara met his death in 1967.
Numerous later revelations about this crisis have illustrated that Kennedy’s caution with the air strike and invasion policy was prudent. Had the Americans have invaded Cuba Khrushchev had authorised the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Kennedy’s profile abroad and that of America in the ‘Cold War’ was greatly improved by this crisis but many within the US thought he was too weak. The Soviets had been discovered clandestinely transporting nuclear material to a hostile neighbour and yet this young American president was prepared to think before acting and tactically leave the door open for his adversary to back down.
The crisis led to a new understanding between the nuclear powers and was a factor bringing about specific nuclear test bans, nuclear non-proliferation agreements and, even less in directly, a period of détente in the ‘Cold War’. In the years after the crisis a ’new and more extensive test ban agreement as well as the installation of a direct and permanently open, or ‘hot’, line of communications’ between the superpowers was achieved.[19]’ It was events in Cuba and Berlin that developed this ‘fearful intimacy[20]’ between the two nations as well as an understanding of ‘the permitted limits of nuclear politics.[21]’ Arms control was not new but with ‘the need to avoid mutual annihilation’ and ‘interest in their own superiority[22]’ were factors in developing the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty and in following decades the SALT agreements and a thawing of the ‘Cold War.’
The Cuban Missile Crisis has become an important ‘test case’ for historians or international relations analysis not least because of the magnitude of the possible outcomes but also that ‘many events were interpreted by the other side as planned and controlled actions when in fact they were neither[23]’ To look at any National Government’s decision output as one man making a ‘rational’ choice is usually a simplification that both ‘obscures as well as reveals’ as more often it is ‘not one calculating decision maker but is rather a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors.[24]’
The simplest explanation of the origins and conclusions of this conflict are that after the Cuban Revolution Castro was on course for a confrontation with the United States and that without the help of USSR they would have lost. Khrushchev’s last major international ‘throw of the dice’ was a risky one that led to his political demise but the Cuban revolution’s survival. Rationality led to the diplomatic solution but these were not simple choices made by one person and could have had many different outcomes. The fear generated by the crisis did have positive effects in developing an understanding between the two countries and arms controls of different types. A less encouraging inference from this conclusion is that even without nuclear parity the real threat of a nuclear exchange upsets normal power politics so that these weapons may be seen as a good addition to ensuring any ‘rogue’ state’s international ambition.
Sebastian O’Brien. November 2006
[1] Graham T. Allison, ‘Essence Of Decision’ Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Pg4
[2] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Pg160
[3] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’
[4] Leycester Coltman, ‘The Real Fidel Castro’ Yale University Press, New Haven and London, Pg14
[5] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’ p692
[6] Ibid
[7] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Pg52
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Ch 13
[11] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, LondonPg 246
[12] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Pg58
[13] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Pg 245
[14] Ibid
[15] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Pg93
[16] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Pg 241
[17]
[18] Graham T. Allison, ‘Essence Of Decision’ Little, Brown and Company, Boston Pg 237
[19] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg 38
[20] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg 41
[21] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg41
[22] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg42
[23] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C.Pg155
[24] Graham T. Allison, ‘Essence Of Decision’ Little, Brown and Company, Boston Pg3
In my examination of the origins of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ I will primarily explain some history predating the 1959 Cuban Revolution but then investigate the rapid deterioration of the relations between the Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the United States of America before this 1962 confrontation. It was the ‘Cold War’ that acted as a catalyst within the origins of this crisis and introduced Soviet influence on the United States of American’s doorstep. The infamous failed ‘Bay of Pigs’ invasion of Cuba by a force of mainly exiled Cubans funded and encouraged covertly by the US that developed the already established, ideological and military links between Cuba and the Soviet Union. I will examine both the origins and conclusions of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ within its ideological context and attempt to look at these events from the perspective of each ‘National Actor’ whilst trying to highlight some of their considerations, motivations, objectives and how different conclusions affected each country. I will also try to illustrate some limitations of the ‘Rational Actor Model[1]’ of analysis. The conclusions are many and varied but the most important for me is that even without nuclear parity the shared view was that ‘no other objective can be of greater importance than avoiding nuclear war[2]’ and that this, led finally, to a diplomatic solution. Khrushchev’s brinksmanship ultimately led to Cuba being safe from US invasion but, with no real strategic advantage for the Soviets, it was a factor in him loosing his job in 1965. Kennedy’s role in the crisis improved his own and America’s reputation on the world stage after the ‘Bay of Pigs’ fiasco but it left Castro in charge in Cuba without diminishing his export of revolutionary zeal, equipment and personnel. The Cuban Missile Crisis has also proved to be a long running ‘test case’ for historians and the study of Crisis Management and Crisis Prevention. These events also improved direct communications between the two ‘Cold War’ superpowers which made possible international agreements on test bans, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation and could be seen as a factor the later period of détente in the ‘Cold War’.
Some of the earliest origins of Cuba’s ‘October Crisis’ are rooted in their perception of the United States of America’s ‘imperial’ influence over them. Cuba was a Spanish colony until the end of the Spanish-American War in 1902 but this was no more that ’a change of masters’[3]for them and Castro ‘studied and admired the heroes of Cuba’s independence movement[4]’ like Jose Marti and hoped to have influence across South America like another of his heroes Simon Bolivar. In January 1959 Cuba’s Revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro, finally toppled the US backed military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista after over two years of guerrilla warfare. Upon taking power Castro initially tried to appease his US neighbours by issuing ‘a number of statements of moderate character’[5] whilst consolidating his position within Cuba. This posturing troubled close confidantes to the Cuban leader like Raul Castro and legendary Argentine Marxist ‘Che’ Guevara but they were later relieved when it became clear that he would ‘attack without delay the special link with the United States’ as to them it represented ‘a form of economic servitude.’[6]
The belief within successive American administrations in the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ that confirmed the role of the US in South America as defending it against imperial exploitation to ensure access to its resources and that if violated the US should ’go in and take over.[7]’ New American President John Fitzgerald Kennedy made the Cuban situation, part of his 1959 presidential campaign when he described Cuba as ‘the most glaring failure of American foreign policy.[8]’ Covert CIA plans to invade Cuba with a force of Cuban exiles was already planned before Kennedy took over and he immediately realised that it could cause problems with the USSR. Days after Kennedy accepted an invitation to meet again with Khrushchev the operation that became known as the ‘Bay Of Pigs’ had started in Cuba. Kennedy had not overcome his initial doubts about visible support from the US; he fatally altered the level of air support from the original plan which led to it being a total failure.
The Soviet Union had agreed in 1959 to send Cuba arms from Warsaw Pact countries but by November 1960 direct arms shipments were coming from the USSR. The fact that the Cuban Revolutionary Movement had keen Marxists at its centre and links with the Cuban Communist (PSP) was hidden at first but the Soviets knew this even if they had lingering doubts about Fidel Castro. When relations between the US and Cuba were deteriorating through the end of the Eisenhower administration the Soviets were quick to help out by taking the majority of the sugar exports that were cut by the US. Khrushchev was insecure about US military domination and was keen to develop Soviet influence in the world and would prove to be prepared to take risks to threaten US hegemony.
The key decision in the origins of this crisis was the clandestine deployment of nuclear warheads to Cuba whilst publicly stating that no ‘offensive’ weapons would be placed there. Castro’s initial doubts about links with the Socialist Bloc had evaporated and he was quoting saying ’Moscow is our brain and our great leader.’[9] Khrushchev had also received a disturbing KGB report from the US outlining that they knew the ‘Missile Gap’ was a fallacy and that it could be in the Americans interest to strike soon before any ‘real’ gap appears. This insecurity and a genuine wish to protect Castro’s revolution led to Khrushchev publicly supporting the Cubans and expressly promising to protect it from outside intervention. The ‘Bay Of Pigs’ invasion had worried Castro, hardened Cuban public against the United States of America, allowed Castro to publicly side with the Soviets and ultimately led to Khrushchev agreeing to supply nuclear material to the now overtly Socialist island of Cuba as a ‘deterrent’ against any future US aggression. This move by Khrushchev was risky and opportunistic as he said himself “this may end in a big war.[10]”
The world became aware of the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 22nd 1962 when American president John F Kennedy announced knowledge of a ‘soviet military build up’ including ‘offensive missile sites’ to provide a ‘nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.[11]’ Days earlier an America U2 surveillance plane pictured these missile sites being built and after a period of consultation the Americans wanted to show they were determined to get them removed and the ‘initial steps[12]’ would be a naval ‘quarantine[13]’ to ensure that no more ‘offensive’ military equipment could arrive on the island. This course of action was finally preferred to an air strike or full-scale invasion by Kennedy because of the threat of a nuclear exchange would be “one hell of a gamble.[14]” This option applied pressure but notably gave the Soviets a diplomatic route out of the conflict that after a number of extremely nervous days Khrushchev took. On October 28th the Soviets notified Washington without consulting Havana that in exchange for the removal of the missiles he would expect America to publicly commit to not invading Cuba. He had decided that ’a communist Cuba without missiles was better for Soviet interests than a U.S.-occupied Cuba.[15]’
One of the most important conclusions of this crisis is that both nuclear superpowers involved needed to protect their interests but ultimately tried to pursue a diplomatic solution to avoid the first nuclear exchange of the ‘Cold War.’ On the day of Kennedy’s October 22nd speech Khrushchev privately admitted “we were not going to unleash war, we just wanted to intimidate them and deter the Anti-Cuban forces[16]”. Even with Khrushchev’s brinksmanship Kennedy had the upper hand strategically. His fear was an air strike of all known missile sites may ‘risk that some remain undetected[17]’ that could then be fired in retaliation against America.
Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for a commitment by the Americans not to invade, to remove the blockade and the removal of US missiles in Turkey within six moths of the crisis. This was not known in the US until six years later and Khrushchev took sharp criticism from within the Presidium about this agreement not being made public. He was ousted a few years after the resolution of this crisis. Deeper analysis reflects that simply looking at the original decision from the ‘Rational Actor Model’ is to ignore the possibility that ’a number of different individuals’ quite distinct perceptions of separable problems snow balling into a single solution[18]’.
Fidel Castro was said to be initially livid about not being consulted about the decision to remove the missiles. Relations did improve later between Castro and Moscow, although, more radical elements within the Cuban government like ‘Che’ Guevara felt betrayed. In concluding the ‘deal’ the superpowers did not get an explicit agreement from Cuba to restrict their support of anti-imperialist movements around the world. In the next few years Cuba were involved in supporting revolutionaries in Andean Peru, Venezuela, Congo and numerous other places like Bolivia, where the incurable revolutionary ‘Che’ Guevara met his death in 1967.
Numerous later revelations about this crisis have illustrated that Kennedy’s caution with the air strike and invasion policy was prudent. Had the Americans have invaded Cuba Khrushchev had authorised the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Kennedy’s profile abroad and that of America in the ‘Cold War’ was greatly improved by this crisis but many within the US thought he was too weak. The Soviets had been discovered clandestinely transporting nuclear material to a hostile neighbour and yet this young American president was prepared to think before acting and tactically leave the door open for his adversary to back down.
The crisis led to a new understanding between the nuclear powers and was a factor bringing about specific nuclear test bans, nuclear non-proliferation agreements and, even less in directly, a period of détente in the ‘Cold War’. In the years after the crisis a ’new and more extensive test ban agreement as well as the installation of a direct and permanently open, or ‘hot’, line of communications’ between the superpowers was achieved.[19]’ It was events in Cuba and Berlin that developed this ‘fearful intimacy[20]’ between the two nations as well as an understanding of ‘the permitted limits of nuclear politics.[21]’ Arms control was not new but with ‘the need to avoid mutual annihilation’ and ‘interest in their own superiority[22]’ were factors in developing the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty and in following decades the SALT agreements and a thawing of the ‘Cold War.’
The Cuban Missile Crisis has become an important ‘test case’ for historians or international relations analysis not least because of the magnitude of the possible outcomes but also that ‘many events were interpreted by the other side as planned and controlled actions when in fact they were neither[23]’ To look at any National Government’s decision output as one man making a ‘rational’ choice is usually a simplification that both ‘obscures as well as reveals’ as more often it is ‘not one calculating decision maker but is rather a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors.[24]’
The simplest explanation of the origins and conclusions of this conflict are that after the Cuban Revolution Castro was on course for a confrontation with the United States and that without the help of USSR they would have lost. Khrushchev’s last major international ‘throw of the dice’ was a risky one that led to his political demise but the Cuban revolution’s survival. Rationality led to the diplomatic solution but these were not simple choices made by one person and could have had many different outcomes. The fear generated by the crisis did have positive effects in developing an understanding between the two countries and arms controls of different types. A less encouraging inference from this conclusion is that even without nuclear parity the real threat of a nuclear exchange upsets normal power politics so that these weapons may be seen as a good addition to ensuring any ‘rogue’ state’s international ambition.
Sebastian O’Brien. November 2006
[1] Graham T. Allison, ‘Essence Of Decision’ Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Pg4
[2] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Pg160
[3] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’
[4] Leycester Coltman, ‘The Real Fidel Castro’ Yale University Press, New Haven and London, Pg14
[5] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’ p692
[6] Ibid
[7] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Pg52
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Ch 13
[11] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, LondonPg 246
[12] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Pg58
[13] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Pg 245
[14] Ibid
[15] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Pg93
[16] Aleksandr Fursenko/ Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell Of A Gamble’ Pimlico, London Pg 241
[17]
[18] Graham T. Allison, ‘Essence Of Decision’ Little, Brown and Company, Boston Pg 237
[19] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg 38
[20] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg 41
[21] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg41
[22] Peter Calvocoressi, ‘World Politics Since 1945’Pg42
[23] Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘Reflections On The Cuban Missile Crisis’ The Brooking Institute, Washington D.C.Pg155
[24] Graham T. Allison, ‘Essence Of Decision’ Little, Brown and Company, Boston Pg3
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